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JAPAN’S ECONOMY FROM BOOM TO BUST 
 




Japan‟s economic evolution for the last half of the century provides us 
with an unique occasion to test alternative theories for growth. This short article 
makes a review of the main economic events and their causes. It maintains that 
behind Japan‟s slump and deflation was the state policy which encouraged a prior 
unsound expansion. 
 
Japan‟s economy boosted after World War II to reach the second position 
in the world. Many people expected Japan to become the first player in the world 
economy by the end of 20
th century. However, this prophecy vanished in the bust 
that ocurred in the 1990s. 
The fascination of “japanese miracle” lead to the writing of many books 
and articles attempting to explain the reasons behind this formidable economic 
growth – Eric Vogel, Japan as Number One, William Ouchi, Theory Z, Eisuke 
Sakakibara,  Beyond  Capitalism,  Herman  Kahn,  The  Emerging  Japanese 
Superstate etc.  
Some economists believe that a strong work ethic as well as high saving 
and investment rates were decisive for Japan‟s ascension in the top developed 
countries. Others think that state intervention in industrial development and export 
planning were the crucial element of this development. 
As a matter of fact, “Japan has experienced both the genuine miracle of the 
market and the counterfeit miracle of the state for the past 150 years.” (herbener, 
1999) after the world war II, the economic growth became so impressive that the 
expression “japanese miracle” was quickly adopted by professional analysts.  
   The  real  economic  growth  for  three  decades  prior  to  the  1990‟s  was 
substantial.  the 1960s marked 10% average growth, the 1970s with 5% average 
growth and the 1980s with 4% average growth.is the enlightened dirigisme of 
japanese  government  responsible  for  this  record?  As  lal  (2002)  argues,  the 
investment rate and the quality of the labor force are better explanation for this 
evolution. 
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In the 1990s, economic growth was much smaller due to over investment 
in the 1980s and contractionary government policies.  In 1996, growth increased 
in response to expansionary fiscal and monetary policies.  However, despite the 
temporary increase, japan entered a recession starting in  1997.  The economy 
began to stabilize in 1999 as fiscal and monetary policies increased government 
spending and improved business confidence.  However, in 2001, japan finds itself 
again  with  a  decline  in  industrial  production,  the  sharpest  since  1993,  and  an 
economy in recession. 
  But more important than simple calculations of GDP is how efficient are 
resources used in producing the goods that subsequently become part of GDP. 
According to Deepak Lal, between 1970 and 1998, the net savings of japanese 
households amounted to 1250 trillion yen. At the same time, the change in net 
worth  for  this  sector  during  the  same  period  was  860.7  trillion  yen.  Put  it 
differently, japanese households lost almost a third of their savings. What is the 
explanation  for  this  huge  loss?  The  reason  seems  to  be  the  huge  rate  of 
investment,  or  rather  overinvestment,  made  by  japanese  firms  which,  in  time, 
proved to be less and less efficient. Thus, for example, in 1996, the same author 
quotes an estimate of the rate of return of only 1.6-2% for the overall economy. 
This rate of return to capital fell from the level of 12% in the 1952-1973 period. 
  Besides  decreasing  returns  to  scale,  a  second  important  factor  for  the 
declining  rate  of  return  was  the  monetary  expansion  engineered  by  Japan‟s 
government. Unsustainable credit expansion has led to malinvestments because 
the artificial decline of the interest rate has stimulated the adoption of investment 
projects with lower returns. 
This event has its roots in the accommodative monetary policy pursued by 
the Bank of Japan (BOJ) in the mid-1980s following the Plaza Accord. The BOJ 
sought  to  stem  the  appreciation  of  the  yen,  which  hurt  its  heavily  export 
dependent economy. Rather than allow market forces to rearrange the pattern of 
production along more sustainable lines, the BOJ began its aggressive campaign 
to bring down the yen. 
Meyer (2004) offers a good historical record of the effects of this policy. 
The BOJ reduced the interest rate from 5% to 2.5% between January 1986 and 
February 1987, a 50% reduction. The result was an uncontrollable expansion, as 
the stock market  scorched its  way upward.  From  January 1985 to  its  peak in 
December of 1989 (based on month-end index prices), the Nikkei nearly tripled. 
From 1986 through 1990, Japan's money stock grew by an average of 10.5% per 
year. 
The BOJ inflated the yen money stock by 10.5% per year from 1986-1990 
and lowered the discount rate from 5% in 1985, where it had been since 1983, to 
2.5% by 1987. Japan exported the credit expansion to Southeast Asia and South 
Korea in the form of direct investment. The massive Japanese investment in Asia 
was augmented by loan guarantees made by the Export-Import Bank of Japan for   69 
investment in and trade with Asia. By the end of the debt binge, Japan was the 
world‟s largest creditor nation manifested by having the world's largest banks and 
had the stock market with the world‟s largest capitalized value. 
Despite the massive yen inflation, the yen appreciated 50% against the 
dollar from the beginning of 1985 to the end of 1988 and consumer-goods prices 
in Japan rose only 0.5% per year while wholesale-goods prices fell 4.6% per year 
indicating that growing yen money demand, international as well as domestic, was 
absorbing the monetary inflation. But supremacy of the yen was short-lived. Yen 
demand collapsed in 1988-1989 causing a 16% devaluation against the dollar and 
a surge of domestic price inflation.  
The BOJ reversed its policy, and abruptly reduced inflation from 12.1% in 
1990 to 4.1% in 1991 and then to 1.2% in 1992. The discount rate was raised five 
times, from 2.5% in 1988 to 6% by 1990. The end of the credit expansion doubled 
interest rates while the reduction in yen inflation helped push up the yen-dollar 
exchange rate 22% from 1989-1993. From a peak of 40,000 in December of 1989, 
the Nikkei tumbled to a low (again, based on month-end prices) of 7,831 in April 
of last year – a drop of 80%. 
“Japan  had  experienced  what  America  discovered  in  the  wake  of  the 
collapse of Bretton-Woods: generating an international credit expansion succeeds 
so  long  as  increases  in  money  demand  keep  price  inflation  in  check.  Japan‟s 
restoration of a yen trading-block in Asia was cut short by America reasserting the 
dominance  of  the  dollar,  first  in  Canada,  Mexico,  Latin  America,  and  South 
America  and  then  in  Asia  and  eastern  and  central  Europe.  The  yen  had  little 
chance against the world‟s reserve currency and the yen-based credit expansion 
collapsed in 1990.” (Herbener, 1999) 
The Bank of Japan attempet to inflate again in the 1990s. Despite the fact 
that the discount rate was lowered from 6% in 1991 to 0.5% by 1997, the banks 
refused to expand credit and instead simply absorbed the new money to hold as 
reserves against bad loans. As Herbener (1999) further explains, “blocked from 
domestic credit expansion, the BOJ tried to expand Japanese bank credit overseas 
with  the  yen  carrying-trade.  Investors  borrowed  yen  at  low  interest  rates, 
converted the yen to dollars and other currencies and bought higher-return assets 
overseas. This put downward pressure on the yen which increased the profitability 
of the strategy. The yen carrying-trade was active from mid-1995 to mid-1998 as 
the yen fell 83% against the dollar, but in July of 1998 the yen began to appreciate 
again, losses ensued and the trade dried up. This policy exacerbated the financial 
debacle in Asia by greatly expanding credit for three years and then suddenly 
shutting it off. The financial debacle in Asia then saddled Japanese banks with 
more foreign bad debt. In response, they cut foreign lending in the first quarter of 
1998 by $244.3 billion or 12%. This cut is the latest in a downward trend that has 
left the once dominant Japanese banks with the same global market share that they 
had in the early 1980s.”   70 
In  fact,  banks  stopped  performing  their  natural  role  of  financial 
intermediaries. Almost all the additional funds they acquired need to be used to 
pay down bad loans instead of expanding credit. From 1995-1998, bank bad loan 
write-offs  were  $300  billion  while  banks  reduced  their  loans  2.7%  from 
September of 1997 to September 1998 and another 5.4% from May 1998 to May 
1999. This is why enormous increases in the monetary base, 10% from mid-1997-
mid-1998, have had little effect on broader monetary aggregates, which rose only 
3.5%.  Critics  state  that  the  root  of  Japan‟s  banking  problem  is  poor  lending 
decisions.  Since  the  1990s  banks  have  written  down  almost  twice  their  entire 
capital and reserves to eliminate the bad debt. 
Japan spent huge amount of public funds to prevent the economy from 
declining further. In 1995, the BOJ dropped its discount rate to 0.5%. In 1998, 
two spending packages worth 40.6 trillion yen were revealed. In 1999, came yet 
another fiscal stimulus package, this one worth 18 trillion yen. In 2000, another 11 
trillion.  Much  of  this  deluge  of  money  was  put  into  public  works  projects  or 
funneled through to politically favored businessmen. Japan's finances weakened 
as its debts grew. 
Another determinant of the economic problems affecting Japan is the low 
return of its foreign investment. Japan‟s has become the largest creditor in the 
world, but unlike past big creditor nations – like Great Britain in the XIX century 
and USA in the XX century – it does not have a leading world currency. In other 
words, Japan has not used its currency to invest abroad, and consequently has 
borne to exchange rate risk. “With the dollar depreciating against the yen, their 
returns  on  foreign  investments  have  been  virtually  wiped  out  over  the  1980-
1990‟s.” (Lal, 2002) 
What could be said in the conclusion of this article. It is best perhaps to 
quote again from Lal (2002): 
“In fact,  the much touted Asian model  of development  – which combined an 
unholy alliance between parts of the government, large industries and the banking 
system – stored up the troubles which have led to the continuing slump. Because 
of the mral hazardcreated in such an economic system the financial system comes 
to  be  stuffed  with  more  and  more  bad  paper,  as  industrialists  overinvest  and 
undertake increasingly dicey investments. The bursting of the 1980‟s asset bubble 
has merely brought these chickens home to roost. What Japan needs is action to 
not  merely    clean  up  the  ensuing  financial  mess  but  to  turn  its  back  on  this 
doomed model.” 
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